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INTRODUCTION
The explosion of design defect litigation during the last two dec-
ades has failed to develop products liability into a cohesive and work-
able body of law. While courts and commentators 1 have struggled to
define the contours of product defect, governmental agencies, 2 pro-
fessional standard-setting groups,3 and trade organizations 4 have un-
IMost literature on products liability in recent years has focused on establishing standards
for design defect. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1980) [hereinafter Birnbaum,
Unmasking the Test for Design Defect]; Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle
Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 643 (1978); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices]; Henderson, Man-
ufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L.
Rev. 625 (1978) [hereinafter Henderson, A Proposed Statutory Reform]; Henderson, Renewed
Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging
Consensus, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 773 (1979) [hereinafter Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy
Over Defective Product Design]; Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a
Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. Rev. 109 (1976); Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards
and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cum. L. Rev. 293 (1980) [hereinafter Keeton, Products
Liability-Design Hazards]; Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products
Liability, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 101 (1977) [hereinafter Phillips, The Standard for Determining
Defectiveness]; Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435
(1979); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse.of Warnings in Products
Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 495 (1976) [hereinafter
Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings]; Wade, On Product
"Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 551 (1980) [hereinafter Wade, On
Product "Design Defects"].
2 Many governmental agencies have been granted statutory responsibility for setting or
reviewing product safety standards. See, e.g., Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204
(1976 & Supp. II 1978) (authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to supervise fabric safety stan-
dards); Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261(l)(1)(D), 1262(e)(1) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)
(authorizing the Secretary of HEW to regulate safety standards for toys); Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (establishing the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSG)); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 341, 351-360
(1976 & Supp. II 1978) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to regulate
quality standards for certain foods and drugs); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
652, 655 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to promulgate national
occupational safety and health standards); Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1455 (1976)
(granting the Secretary of Transportation power to set boating construction safety standards);
Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1421-1432 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (authorizing the
Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations to promote safety of civil aircraft).
3 Such professional standard-setting groups include the American National Standards Insti-
tute, the American Society for Testing and Materials, and the Underwriters' Laboratory. See
Implementation of the Consumer Product Safety Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Con-
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dertaken the task of setting specific safety standards. These concur-
rent activities have created tensions between those responsible for
setting the standards and those who ultimately must judge their effi-
cacy and worth. An aura of crisis has ensued.5 Commentators have
sumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 95th Cong., 1st Sem.
(1977) [hereinafter Implementation of the CPSA]; Consumer Product Safety Commission Over-
sight Hearings on S. 644 and S. 100 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 644 and S. 10001.
See generally Report on Consumer Representation in Voluntary Standards Setting. Year Two,
Standardization News, Apr. 1980, at 8-15 (presented by the National Consumers League to the
American Society for Testing and Materials).
4 Trade organizations that have been involved in the process of setting safety standards
include the American Gas Association, the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers. the
Outdoor Power Equipment Institute, and the Bicycle Manufacturers Association of America.
See generally Implementation of the CPSA, supra note 3; Hearings on S. 644 and S. 1000. supra
note 3.
5 See Model Uniform Product Liability Act. 44 Fed. Reg. 62.714 t1979) [hereinafter
UPLA]. Both the Introduction and the Preamble to the UPLA contain discussions of the prob-
lems perceived to exist in the current products liability system. Section 101 of the UPLA makes
the following specific findings:
(A) Sharply rising product liability insurance premiums have created serious problems
in commerce resulting in:
(1) Increased prices of consumer and industrial products;
(2) Disincentives for innovation and for the development of high-risk but potentially bene-
ficial products;
(3) An increase in the number of product sellers attempting to do business without prod-
uct liability insurance coverage, thus jeopardizing both their continued existence and the
availability of compensation to injured persons; and
(4) Legislative initiatives enacted in a crisis atmosphere that may. as a result. unreasonably
curtail the rights of product liability claimants.
(B) One cause of these problems is that product liability law is fraught with uncer-
tainty and sometimes reflects an imbalanced consideration of the interests it affects. The
rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and are subject to rapid and substantial change.
These facts militate against predictability of litigation outcome.
(C) Insurers have cited this uncertainty and imbalance as justifications for setting
rates and premiums that, in fact, may not reflect actual product risk or liability losses.
(D) Product liability insurance rates are set on the basis of countryvide, rather than
individual state, experience. Insurers utilize countrywide experience because a product
manufactured in one state can readily cause injury in any one of the other states, the
District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. One ramification of this prac-
tice is that there is little an individual state can do to solve the problems caused by
product liability.
(E) Uncertainty in product liability law and litigation outcome has added to litigation
costs and may put an additional strain on the judicial system.
(F) Recently enacted state product liability legislation has widened existing disparities
in the law.
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attacked courts for expanding the scope of manufacturer liability 6 and
providing juries with unchecked discretion in products liability
cases. 7 Furthermore, both manufacturers and consumers have
criticized governmental agencies for their ineffective attempts at
standard-setting. 8 The outcries of manufacturers and insurers have
Id. at 62,716. See generally Epstein, supra note 1; Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufactur-
ers' Conscious Design Choices, supra note 1, at 1531-34; Henderson, A Proposed Statutory
Reform, supra note 1; Johnson, Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56
N.C.L. Rev. 677 (1978); Phillips, An Analysis of the Proposed Reform of Products Liability
Statute of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 664 (1978); Twerski, Rebuilding the Citadel: The Legis-
lative Assault on the Common Law, Trial, Nov. 1979, at 55-59, 83; U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Final Report (1977).
6 See, e.g., Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design,
supra note 1, at 782-94 (criticizing Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant manufacturer); Twerski,
Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 516-17
(criticizing Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975), for failure to consider tie
societal cost of warning about a very remote risk); id. at 517-20 (criticizing Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), for inadequate treatment of failure-to-warn
cases involving irreducible risks).
7 See, e.g., Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design,
supra note 1, at 799-801 (criticizing Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978),
for improper allocation of functions between judge and jury).
8 See Consumer Product Safety Commission Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-9 (1977) (state-
ment of Jerome Blomberg) (criticizing CPSC regulations for disruptive effect on the construction
industry); id. at 9-61 (statement of Marvin Schneiderman et at.) (criticizing the CPSC for failure
to set up specific guidelines and regulations for treatment and testing of hazardous chemicals In
consumer products); id. at 61-104 (statement of Edward Garvey et al.) (criticizing the CPSC for
failure to study artificial turf used in athletic stadiums); id. at 232-46 (statement of Linda Hudak)
(criticizing the CPSC for delay in implementing a set of working priorities and laxness in prom-
ulgating mandatory safety standards); Implementation of the CPSA, supra note 3, at 2-14
(statement of Robert Harris) (criticizing the CPSC for failure to develop adequate policy
guidelines and regulations regarding toxic chemicals, including carcinogens); id. at 24-30 (state-
ment of William T. Cavanaugh) (commenting on general delay and inefficiency of the CPSC
standard-setting process and on lack of coordination between the CPSC and another standard-
setting organization); id. at 45-46 (statement of Dennis C. Dix) (criticizing absence of factual
documentation for power lawnmower product file published by the CPSC); id. at 62-68 (state-
ment of Donald Peyton) (stating that the CPSC's inflexibility and failure to adopt voluntary
rather than mandatory standards have impeded the CPSC's ability to promulgate many stan-
dards); id. at 68-78 (statement of Aaron Locker) (arguing that the CPSC must use voluntary
standard-setting to fulfill its mandate); Hearings on S. 644 and S. 1000, supra note 3, at 33-46
(statement of Harry A. Paynter) (calling for greater CPSC resources for setting voluntary stan-
dards for gas appliances); id. at 55-62 (statement of Frank Hogdon) (criticizing the CPSO's Inten-
tion to formulate mandatory standards for gas heaters); id. at 100-06 (statement of Richard H.
Gimer) (criticizing the CPSC for failure to perform in-depth analyses, resulting in inability to
give adequate attention to existing voluntary standards); id. at 127-33 (statement of Jay Townley)
(discussing industry's inability to comply with conflicting state and federal standards); Id. at
136-40 (statement by Aaron Locker) (recommending federal preemption of state standards for
toy manufacturing).
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generated voluminous legislative proposals at the federal 9 and state
levels 10 and have led to the enactment of improvident legislation."
9 Currently, two major pieces of legislation that seek to alter or clarifv liability standards
with respect to products liability litigation are before Congress: the National Product Liability
Act, H.R. 5626, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 Cong. Rec. H932 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1979), and the
Uniform Product Liability Act, H.R. 7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 Cong. Ree. H2464 (daily
ed. Apr. 1, 1980). The UPLA has already been promulgated by the U.S. Department of
Commerce as a model act to be adopted voluntarily by the states. See UPLA, supra note 5.
Several other bills bearing on the products liability crisis have been introduced: H.R. 1061,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. H187 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (bill to improve the safety
of products manufactured and sold in interstate commerce and to reduce the number of deaths
and injuries caused by such products); H.R. 1675, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Re. H40-2
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979) (bill to establish federal products liability standards); H.R. 1676, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. H402 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979) (bill to provide uniform stan-
dards for state products liability laws); H.R. 2964, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Ree. H13-7
(daily ed. Mar. 14, 1979) (bill to establish a federal Insurance Commission to regulate the
insurance industry, to establish federal products liability standards, and to amend the Internal
Revenue Code to exempt trusts established for the payment of products liability claims from
income tax); the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1980. H.R. 6152. 96th Cong.. 1st Sess.,
125 Cong. Rec. H12,101 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1979) (bill to facilitate establishnent by sellers of
product liability risk retention groups and to purchase product liability insurance on a group
basis) Crhis bill was passed by the House on March 10. 1980. 126 ong. Bee. H1671. The
Senate held hearings on April 22, 1980, on the bill but has not yet voted on it. See Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. Rep. No. 934. 96ith Cong., 2d Sess.
(urging passage of the bill)); H.R. 7040, 96th Cong., 2 Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. H12544 (daily ed.
Apr. 15, 1980) (bill to amend Title 18 of the U.S.C. to impose penalties for nondisclosure by
businesses of serious concealed dangers in products and business practices).
10 Many states have passed statutes of limitation on products liability actions. E.g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551 (Supp. 1957-1979); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a(a) (West Supp.
1980); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 105-106 (4408) (Insert 1978 in Cum. Supp. 1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
83, § 22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966-1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1979); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979); N.D. Cent. Code 9 28-01.1-02 (Supp.
1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905 (1979); 1.I. Gen. La.s § 9-1-13 (Cum. Supp. 1979); S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 234703 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Utah
Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1977).
Some states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no defect if the
alleged defect results from a design that conformed to the state of the art at the time the
product was first designed or sold. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979);
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-2OA-4b)(4) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.310(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1980), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979).
Several states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no defect when
someone other than the defendant alters or modifies the product in a manner not reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant and the alteration or modification is the proximate cause of the
claimant's injury. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-683(2) (Supp. 19W7-1979); Ga. Code Ann. §
105-106 (4408) (Insert 1978 in Cum. Supp. 1977); Ind. Code Ann. 344-20A4tb)[3) (Burns
Cum. Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.320(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1980); N.C. Cen. Stat. § 99B-3
(1979); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-04 (Supp. 1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.915 (1979); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-1-32 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3708 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-15-5 (1977).
Several states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no defect when the
design of the product or its method of manufacturing conforms to federal or state standards.
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The harsh criticisms by industry and insurers have struck a re-
sponsive chord in some quarters of the legal community. One com-
mentator, for example, has questioned whether courts are capable of
deciding complex design defect cases. 12 He argues that product de-
sign involves sensitive trade-offs which are often polycentric in na-
ture; every design decision can impinge on or foster ancillary changes
in other features of the product. 13 The cumulative effect of these
polycentric trade-offs, he suggests, may be that courts are incapable
of approving or condemning the design of a product. 14 An alterna-
tive to judicial review might be for state and federal administrative
agencies to undertake the decisionmaking role because they would
not suffer from the structural infirmities that plague courts.1 5 This
alternative, however, is neither practicable nor desirable. The simple
truth is that although there are tens of thousands of products on the
market, government has been able to regulate only in narrowly de-
fined categories. 16 Furthermore, the imposition of overly stringent
E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(b) (Gum. Supp. 1979); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-05(3)
(Supp. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3704 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15.6(3)
(1977).
Finally, several states recognize a defense for unforeseeable misuse of the product. E.g.,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-683(3) (Supp. 1957-1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-4(b)(1), (2)
(Burns Cum. Supp. 1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-4 (1979).
11 Some of the statutes are particularly onerous. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-683(1)
(Supp. 1957-1979) (recognizing a defense if defect results from fabrication that conformed to
the state of the art at the time the product was first sold by defendant); Ind. Code Ann. §
34-4-20A-4(b)(4) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978) (recognizing state of the art defense if product was
prepared in conformity with the generally recognized state of the art at the time the product
was designed); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:3 (Supp. 1979) (recognizing defense of product
alteration even if product alteration is a concurrent cause). See generally Twerski, Rebuilding
the Citadel: The Legislative Assault on the Common Law, Trial, Nov. 1979, at 55.
12 This thesis has been presented forcefully by Professor James Henderson in a series of
articles. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices, supra
note 1; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 Ind,
L.J. 467 (1976) [hereinafter Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept]; Henderson, Re-
newed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design, supra note 1.
13 Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 12, at 475-76; Henderson,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices, supra note 1, at 1534-42.
14 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices, supra note 1,
at 1539-42; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 12, at 488-91.
15 A governmental decisionmaker who decides to impose a safety standard must balance all
the risk-utility factors and reach a managerial decision in favor of the preferable design.
Professor Henderson does not contend that polycentric decisions cannot be made rationally, but
that the courts are ill-equipped to do so because they can resolve questions only in a linear
sequence. See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 12, at 471-73;
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices, supra note 1, at
1538-39, 1576; Henderson, A Proposed Statutory Reform, supra note 1, at 626.
16 See note 8 supra.
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and inflexible design parameters by governmental agencies might se-
verely inhibit product innovation.' 7 Additionally, as consumer advo-
cates fear, governmental regulation could become the lowest common
denominator to which manufacturers flee to escape liability or, at the
very least, governmental harassment.1 8 Solutions to the problems of
17 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission Oversight: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong.. 1st Sem. 3-9
(1977) (statement of Jerome Blomberg) (criticizing federal regulations for lack of flexibility and
disruptive effect on the construction industry); Implementation of the Consumer Product Safety
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Commerce. Science, and
Transportation Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-68 (1977) (statement of Donald Peyton) (em-
phasizing need for flexibility and voluntary standards to provide incentive to improve standards);
id. at 68-86 (statement of Aaron Locker) (arguing that government cannot provide sufficient
resources to mandate adequate standards without incorporating voluntary standards); Hearings
on S. 644 and S. 1000, supra note 3, at 33-35 (statement of Harry A. Paynter) (contending that
governmental standards would be inflexible and would hinder innovation while voluntary stan-
dards would not); id. at 108-09 (statement of Richard Gimer) (criticizing the CPSC for its failure
to give adequate attention to existing voluntary standards which, unlike government mandates,
maximize product safety by marshalling the managerial and technological talent in American
industry).
is The most recent attempt to resolve the problem of compliance with regulatory standards
can be found in UPLA § 108(A) which provides:
(A) When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture. in
compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety stan-
dards relating to design or performance, the product shall be deemed not defective...
unless the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably prudent
seller could and would have taken additional precautions.
UPLA, supra note 5, § 108A, at 62,730. This provision does not appear to accomplish anything
more than the traditional common law approach. It does not shift the burden of proof becuse
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving defect. Every product at the outset is deemed -not
defective" unless the claimant proves the unreasonableness of the design.
Some of the recently enacted state statutes go beyond the UPLA by creating either an
absolute defense or a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness if the manufacturer has com-
plied with statutory or administrative standards. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-4O3t1)b)
(Cum. Supp. 1979) (rebuttable presumption); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:4 (Cum. Supp.
1979) (affirmative defense); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3704 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (rebuttable pre-
sumption); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) (1977).
In an attempt to be evenhanded, the drafters of the UPLA addressed the question of
noncompliance with a statutory standard:
When the injury-causing aspect of the product was not, at the time of manulaeture.
in compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety
standards relating to design or performance, the product shall be deemed defective ...
unless the product seller proves by a preponderance of the ecdence that its failure to
comply was a reasonably prudent course of conduct under the circumstances.
UPLA, supra note 5, § 108(B), at 62,730 (emphasis added). This section appears to create a
reasonableness defense to negligence per se. It is possible that the drafters meant to excuse a
violation of the statute only when compliance would have created greater dangers than non-
compliance. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288(A)[e) (1977). The language or § iOSB).
however, would permit a finding of nonnegligence merely because the conduct of the defendant
was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of excused violation, see W. Prosser.
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 36, at 199-200 (4th ed. 1971), was never meant to undermine
the basic judgment reflected in the statute as to the standard of care.
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design defect litigation, therefore, should be sought in the legal stan-
dards applied by courts.
In the past decade, the emphasis in both design defect litiga-
tion 19 and standard-setting 20 has been on evaluating the quality of
19 Although the approaches to identifying "unreasonably dangerous" designs have prolifer-
ated in recent years, the approaches generally fall into four classes. The first, usually associated
with Dean Wade, focuses on whether the manufacturer would be judged negligent if he had
known of the product's unreasonably dangerous condition at the time it was marketed (the
"retrospective negligence" approach). See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973) [hereinafter Wade, On Strict Liability]. The second, associated
with Dean Keeton, compares the risk and utility of the product at the time of trial (the "risk-
utility" approach). See Keeton, Manufacturers' Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Man-
ufacture and Design of Products, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 559, 569-71 (1969) [hereinafter Keeton,
Manufacturers' Liability]. The third, following the Restatement, focuses on consumer expecta-
tions about the product (the "consumer expectation" approach). See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A, Comment i (1977). The fourth combines the risk-utility and consumer expectation
tests. See cases cited infra in this note. Because Wade would focus on the risk and utility of the
product as well, the disagreement between Wade and Keeton is over the time factor. Keeton
would hold a manufacturer liable when the risks in his product-based upon information avail-
able at the time of trial-exceed its utility, even if those risks were unknowable at the time of
manufacture or sale. Wade would not. See Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards, supra
note 1, at 307-08; Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398,
408-09 (1970); Wade, On Strict Liability, supra, at 834-35. On the distinction between un-
foreseeable risk and unforeseeable technology in this context, see Schwartz, supra note 1, at
482-83; Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Lw-A Rush to
Judgment, 28 Drake L. Rev. 221, 227-28 (1979) [hereinafter Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique
of the UPLL] (suggesting that manufacturer could be held liable for unforeseeable risks but not
for unforeseeable technology). Some commentators oppose strict liability in design defect and
failure-to-warn cases altogether. See note 29 infra.
Although most courts agree that some form of risk-utility balancing is appropriate in design
defect cases, see note 22 infra, controversy reigns over the propriety of an independent con-
sumer expectation standard. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Ad-
ministration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. Rev. 803, 843-44 (1976);
Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability
Concepts, 60 Marq. L. Rev. 297, 312-16 (1977) (championing such a standard). But see UPLA §
104B and Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,724 (1979) (opposing an independent consumer expectation
standard as overly subjective); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect, supra note 1,
at 611-16 (criticizing the incorporation of "haphazard subjectivity" into straightforward risk-utility
approach); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 472-81 (questioning the ability of a consumer expectation
standard to apply to complex technological questions).
A number of courts have embraced a combined standard. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d
443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 170-71, 406 A.2d 140, 150 (1979). Although it would not seem that the expectations of
consumers, reasonable or otherwise, necessarily would accord with what manufacturers would in
reasonable hindsight do, some courts regard the consumer expectation and retrospective negli-
gence approaches as equivalent. See, e.g., Welch v. Outboard Motor Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254
(5th Cir. 1973) ("We see no necessary inconsistency between a seller-oriented standard and a
user-oriented standard when, as here, each turns on foreseeable risks. They are two sides of the
same standard."); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779
(1975) ("[iun determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer (the court con-
siders the] relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed
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the ultimate design of the product. The objective of design defect
litigation and standard-setting is the same-the establishment of a
standard of reasonable safety. The method of setting a safety stan-
dard, however, differs from the process of reviewing a design deci-
sion. When a court decides a design defect case, it sets a standard in
a negative fashion. If it holds the defendant liable, the court declares
that the design is inadequate and that the product does not meet the
minimum level of societal acceptability. Unlike an agency that sets
affirmative standards by choosing among alternative designs, the court
examines alternatives designs only to discover whether there is an
economically feasible alternative that would provide greater safety
than the design in question and that would have prevented the in-
jury. 21
The overwhelming consensus among courts deciding design de-
fect cases is that risk-utility analysis should be used as either an ex-
clusive or an alternative ground of liability. 22 Any such analysis
defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk"); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 592, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974) ("a manufecturer who would be
negligent in marketing a given product, considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing a
product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase it"). See also
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect, supra note 1, at 614-18 (criticizing combined
standard).
20 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051(a}{3). 2O3SMc) (1976); Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, id. § 1392.
21 For a discussion of the differences between affirmative and negative standard-setting as
they relate to the issue of polycentricity, see Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler. The Use
and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 524-28.
2 See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volksagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-73 (4th Cir. 1974)
(exclusive ground); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck. 593 P.2d 871, 895 (Alaska 1979) (alternative
ground); Barker v. Lull Engr Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 445-56. 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 237-38 (1978) (alternative ground); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150.
170-71, 406 A.2d 140, 150 (1979) (alternative ground); Mieallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386.
348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976) (exclusive ground); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft, 282 Or. 61, 67-68, o77 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978) (exclusive ground).
Still controversial, however, is how specific a court should be when instructing a jury on
risk-utility factors. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844. 850 tTex. 1979)
(adopting risk-utility approach but expressly declining to enumerate specific factors in jury in-
struction). The failure to include relevant factors in the instruction could lead the jury to er-
roneous conclusions. For example, a charge directing the jury to balance utility and risk but
omitting mention of the cost of improvement could lead the juy to exculpate the defendant
when utility exceeds risk, even if the cost of improvement is quite small. Conversely. the same
charge could lead the jury to find the defendant liable when risk exceeds utility even if the cost
of improvement is excessive. See Thibault v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H 802. 807. 395
A.2d 843, 846 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp.. 584 S.W.2d 844, 854 (Tex. 1979)
(Campbell, J., concurring). On the specificity of the jury charge generally. see Birnbaum. Un-
masking the Test for Design Defect, supra note 1, at 631-36; Donaher. Piehler, Twerski &
Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation. 52 Tex. L Rev. 1303.
1308 n.29 (1974); Keeton, Products liability- Design Hazards. supra note 1. at 314-16 Wade,
On Product "Design Defects," supra note 1, at 572.
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involves making trade-offs that take into account design or performance
requirements, the effects of those requirements on reducing hazards,
the utility and cost of the product, and technological capabilities. 23
23 Extensive commentary identifies the factors necessary to a risk-utility or risk-benefit ap-
proach. Professor Wade suggests the following considerations:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not
be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product with-
out impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 837-38.
Professor Fischer proposes a more extensive list, including: (1) The ability of the consumer
to bear loss; (2) The feasibility and effectiveness of the consumer's self-protective measures, such
as the risks, ability to control the danger, and feasibility of deciding against use of the product;
(3) The manufacturer's knowledge of the risk, the accuracy of prediction of losses, the size of
such losses, the availability of insurance, the ability of the manufacturer to self-insure, the effect
of increased prices on industry, the public necessity for the product, and the deterrent effect on
the development of new products; (4) Safety incentives such as the likelihood of future product
improvement, the existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken, and the avail-
ability of safer substitutes. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L.
Rev. 339, 359 (1974).
Professor Shapo, building upon his representational theory as the basis of products liability,
offers 13 considerations relevant to establishing defect:
1. The nature of the product as a vehicle for creation of persuasive advertising Im-
ages, and the relationship of this factor to the ability of sellers to generate product rep-
resentations in mass media;
2. The specificity of representations and other communications related to the prod-
uct;
3. The intelligence and knowledge of consumers generally and of the disappointed
consumer in particular;
4. The use of sales appeals based on specific consumer characteristics;
5. The consumer's actions during his encounter with the product, evaluated in the
context of his general knowledge and intelligence and of his actual knowledge about the
product or that which reasonably could be ascribed to him;
6. The implications of the proposed decision for public health and safety generally,
and especially for social programs that provide coverage for accidental injury and personal
disability;
7. The incentives that the proposed decision would provide to make the product
safer;
8. The cost to the producer and other sellers of acquiring the relevant information
about the crucial product characteristic and the cost of supplying it to persons in the
position of the disappointed party;
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This confrontation between the limits of technology and the require-
ments of law in developing reasonably safe products suggests that
risks of injury arising from the use of a product will always be pres-
ent.24 The product designer must, therefore, find some way to limit
the risks associated with the product to an acceptable level without
compromising the marketability and utility of the product. The law
purports to stand as watchdog to ensure that product design decisions
made by manufacturers do not expose product users to unreasonable
risks of injury. Thus, in a design defect case, the issue is whether the
manufacturer properly weighed the alternatives and evaluated the
trade-offs and thereby developed a reasonably safe product; the focus
is unmistakably on the quality of the decision and whether the deci-
sion conforms to socially acceptable standards.
9. The availability of the relevant information about the crucial product characteristic
to persons in the position of the disappointed party and the cost to them of acquiring it;
10. The effects of the proposed decision on the availabilitv of data that bear on con-
sumer choice of goods and services;
11. Generally, the likely effects on prices and quantities of goods sold;
12. The costs and benefits attendant to determination of the legal issues involved,
either by private litigation or by collective social judgment; and
13. The effects of the proposed decision on wealth distribution, both between sellers
and consumers and among sellers.
Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine. Function and Legal Lia-
bility for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109. 1370-71 (1974).
Professors Montgomery and Owen have sought to compress many of the factors into a
four-part formulation:
(1) The cost of injuries attributable to the condition of the product about which the plain-
tiff complains-the pertinent accident costs.
(2) The incremental cost of marketing the product without the offending condition-the
manufacturer's safety cost.
(3) The loss of functional and psychological utility occasioned by the elimination of the
offending condition-the publics safety cost.
(4) The respective abilities of the manufacturer and the consumer to (a) recognize the risks
of the condition, (b) reduce such risks, and (c) absorb or insure against such risks-the
allocation of risk awareness and control between the manufacturer and the consumer.
Montgomery & Owen, supra note 19, at 818; see Dickerson, Products Liability How Good
Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 Ind. L.J. 301, 331 (196M. Vetri, Products Liability: The De-
veloping Framework for Analysis, 54 Or. L. Rev. 293, 305-14 (1975).
24 The court in Phillips v. Kimwod Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 495. 525 P.2d 1033. 1038
(1974), stated this principle clearly:
To some it may seem that absolute liability has been imposed upon the manufacturer
since it might be argued that no manufacturer could reasonably put into the stream of
commerce an article which he realized might result in injury to a user. This is not the
case, however. The manner of injury may be so fortuitous and the chances of injury
occurring so remote that it is reasonable to sell the product despite the danger. In design
cases the utility of the article may be so great, and the change of design necessary to
alleviate the danger in question may so impair such utility. that it is reasonable to market
the product as it is, even though the possibility of injury exists and %%as realized at the
time of the sale.
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The thesis of this Article is that there has been altogether too
much emphasis placed on the quality of the final design at the ex-
pense of ignoring the process by which critical decisions are made. If
the law is to serve a prophylactic function and promote the goal of
product safety, it must abandon this singleminded focus which forces
courts to second-guess product safety decisions. Instead, we must
place under judicial and administrative scrutiny the process by which
the decisions are made. Our contention is that a structured, well-
articulated, and highly visible standard-setting process performed by
private industry or private consensus standard-setting groups can pro-
vide greater assurance of product safety than does the present sys-
tem, which reviews only the quality of a manufacturer's decision on a
particular product feature.
Thus, we propose a new defense in design defect litigation -a
process defense. If a manufacturer defends an action by revealing a
well-documented safety review process, the court should presume
that the product is not defective. 25 If the process leading to a design
decision has a high degree of integrity, the court should restrict its
review of the design itself to instances in which the industry has
clearly erred. 26 In short, judicial review of a product's design should
shift the emphasis from the ultimate design to the process that
brought the product into existence.
I
PROCESS LIABILITY-INTRODUCING THE THEME
To appreciate the significance of focusing on the process of prod-
uct development, one must understand the complexity of the design
process, the various stages at which critical decisions are made, and
the array of competing interests and points of view that affect the
decisions at each stage. As the product progresses along the stages of'
development-from initial concept through prototype, pilot line, and
final production-financial and psychological commitments are made.
Theoretically, the design can be modified, its market refined, or its
price altered at any stage before, or even after, initial marketing. But
the quality and the nature of the decisionmaking process change sig-
nificantly as the product evolves. Additional safety features required
to minimize hazards may be incorporated more easily if the need is
discovered and identified in the concept or prototype stages of de-
25 See pp. 375-77 infra.
26 See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
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velopment than if recognized during pilot line production.2 7 Deci-
sions that may appear reasonable as responses to design problems
appearing late in the design process may be unconscionable if consid-
ered in light of the wider range of possible alternatives available in
the early stages of product development. On the other hand, we may
be less willing to second-guess decisions made on the basis of limited
alternatives if: (1) the alternatives were carefully considered at an
early stage of product development; (2) the reasons for rejecting cer-
tain alternatives are clearly articulated; and (3) few viable alternatives
were available. In fact, it may not be possible to undertake com-
prehensive risk-utility analysis of product design, whether in develop-
ing standards, designing products, or adjudicating products liability
cases, without understanding the developmental process.
It is important at this point to question how a process-based ap-
proach would relate to the developing law of products liability. When
we suggest that we turn our attention to process rather than to the
final product, is this a return to the negligence standard and an aban-
donment of the hard-fought gains of strict liability? In strict products
liability, the focus is on the product and not on the conduct of the
manufacturer.2 8  Process, however, speaks to conduct, which is the
concern of negligence standards, rather than to the end result-the
product.
The answer is both yes and no. To the extent that we propose to
examine the conduct of a manufacturer, not with regard to the quality
of particular decisions, but with regard to how those decisions were
made, we beat a partial retreat even from the strictures of the negli-
gence doctrine.29  Successful operation of the defense, however, still
permits the plaintiff to attack design defects on strict liability princi-
ples, subject to an increased quantum of proof.30
27 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Design Review Guidelines 2 (Booklet MB-3284) (n.d.):
Why have Formal Design Revievs?... [P]roblems detected at predetermined points in
the [manufacturing] process can be corrected more quickly and economically titan prob-
lems which are detected after manufacture is complete. This Is true of all complex
processes-including the product engineering design process.
28 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1977).
29 There is considerable support for a retreat from the strict liability doctrine in several
areas of design defect litigation: cases of unforeseeable and unknowable harm, see, e.g.,
Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788. 794 (8th Cir. 1977); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex. 1974); and design
defect and failure-to-warn cases generally, see, e.g., UPLA. supra note 5. § 104(B). (C), at
62,723-25; Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect, supra note 1. at 643-4; Epstein.
supra note 1, at 651-54; Hoenig, supra note 1, at 125-37.
30 See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
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II
A CONCERN WITH PROCESS-SOME EARLY STIRRINGS
Recent legislative and judicial discussions of design standards
have alluded to process-oriented guidelines. If the subject has not
been presented with the clarity it deserves, it is only because process
analysis has yet to be identified as an independent mechanism that
can play an important role in judging the efficacy of both product
design and product design safety standards.
A. Process Values and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission
The importance of process in setting design standards received
judicial expression in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission,3' which reviewed the first safety standard prom-
ulgated by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)-the
swimming pool slide safety standard. 32 To reduce the risk of injuries
incurred when sliding headfirst into a pool, this standard required
manufacturers to include a sharply worded warning about the possi-
bility of paralysis. It also mandated a ladder chain device to prevent
children from sliding into deep water. The court overturned both of
these requirements on the ground that the CPSC had not supported
its findings by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole. 33
The court was not convinced that the proposed requirements would
actually reduce the risk of injury.34 It also found that the CPSC had
not properly assessed the economic impact that one of the warnings
might have on slide sales. 35
Aqua Slide warrants careful analysis. At one level, the court,
after having decided that the "reasonable necessity" of a provision
was governed by risk-utility criteria similar to those used in tort
law,36 merely ruled that it was unable to make a "substantial evi-
dence" review without risk-utility evidence. 37 A closer reading of
31 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978). Courts frequently review the decisionmaking process In
many areas of administrative law. See generally Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(2)(A),
(C)-(E), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)-(E) (1976); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
487-88 (1951) (substantial evidence review of agency adjudicatory function); WBEN, Inc. v.
United States, 396 F.2d 601, 610-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968) (arbitrary and
capricious standard for rulemaking); f. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curlam)
(arbitrary and capricious standard for informal decisionmakdng).
32 16 C.F.R. § 1207 (1980).
33 569 F.2d at 843, 844.
34 Id. at 840-44.
35 Id. at 842-43.
36 Id. at 839.
37 Id. at 839-40.
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Aqua Slide, however, leads to the conclusion that the court was un-
prepared to accept the value judgments of the CPSC because the
court could not gauge the process by which the decisions to impose
the requirements had been reached. Despite the court's manifest dis-
comfort with the standard, it appears that if the CPSC had presented
evidence demonstrating that it had performed risk-utility balancing,
the court would have been prepared to accept the Commission's con-
clusions. Consider the court's initial criticism of the CPSC:
Except for the brief statement of basis and purpose accompaning
the promulgated rule, there is little indication of the relative
weight given to various documents by the Commission. The Com-
mission's reliance on the [National Swimming Pool] Institute [a
trade organization], the Institute's deference to its consultant ....
and the Commission's use of yet another consultant... make the
actual thread of reasoning relied on by the agency even more dif-
ficult to follow ....
In this context, the duty of the Court to discern "substantial
evidence on the record as a whole" requires a look at both sub-
stance and procedure. While the ultimate question is whether the
record contains "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion". the inability
of any court to weigh diverse technical data also demands an in-
quiry to determine whether the Commission "carried out [its] es-
sentially legislative task in a manner reasonable under the state of
the record before [it]." 38
Later in the opinion, the court again emphasized process: "[T]he
Court will defer to Commission fact-finding expertise, but it can do so
only when the record shows the Commission has made an actual
judgment concerning the significance of the evidence." a9
The thrust of the opinion is clear. Substance and procedure are
hopelessly intertwined when courts, lacking technical expertise, re-
view standards that require careful evaluation of risk-utility data.
The clearer the evidence is that the expert has weighed the relevant
data, the more the courts will defer to his opinion. 40 This does not
- Id. at 837-38 (citations omitted).
39 Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
40 In a common lawv decision that has attracted much attention, the Oregon Supreme Court
addressed the importance of examining the process of the Federal Aiation Administration
(FAA) in determining whether to uphold the agencys safety standard. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978), was a wrongful death action brought as a result of an
airplane crash. The allegation of design defect %as premised on the manufactureFs use of a
carbureted engine rather than a fuel-injected engine. The former %as subject to icing; the latter
was not. Justice Linde, in his concurring opinion, made the following observations on the ap-
proval of the carbureted engine by the FAA-
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mean that careful adherence to an appropriate decisionmaking process
will lead to total obeisance. Rather, a thorough process that is fully
explained should raise a presumption of a valid decision.
B. The Draft Uniforn Product Liability Law
Process analysis has been considered in legislative proposals as
well as in judicial decisions. In 1979, the Department of Commerce
issued a Draft Uniform Product Liability Law (UPLL) 41 containing
provisions that accounted for both governmental and nongovernmen-
tal 42 safety standards. Under the UPLL, compliance with such stan-
dards would have created a presumption that the product was not
defective, as long as those formulating the standards had followed cer-
tain procedures. The drafters of the UPLL solicited responses and re-
ceived extensive commentary and critique on the law from. industry,
consumer groups, insurers, practicing attorneys, and academics. 43 As
[Tlhis aircraft is alleged to be defective not because it fell short of the safety standards set
for its type, but on the ground that these standards provide insufficient safety for the
whole series. But once the common-law premise of liability is expressed as a balance of
social utility so closely the same as the judgment made in administering safety legislation,
it becomes very problematic to assume that one or a sequence of law courts and juries are
to repeat that underlying social judgment de novo as each sees fit. Rather, when tile
design of a product is subject not only to prescribed performance standards but to gov-
ernment supervised testing and specific approval or disapproval on safety grounds, no
further balance whether the product design is "unreasonably dangerous" for its intended
or foreseeable use under the conditions for which it is approved needs to be struck by a
court or a jury unless one of two things can be shown: either that the standards of safety
and utility assigned to the regulatory scheme are less inclusive or demanding than the
premises of the law of products liability, or that the regulatory agency did not address the
allegedly defective element of the design or in some way fell short of its assigned task.
It is these two questions, rather than a de novo evaluation of the safety of a design
and the technological feasibility and costs of an even safer alternative, that properly be-
come the issues for preliminary determination by a trial court in deciding whether a
"design defect" claim against a product specifically tested and approved under govern-
ment safety regulations should nevertheless go to a jury. In other words, it should be
defendant's burden to show that a governmental agency has undertaken the responsibility
of making substantially the same judgment that the court would otherwise be called on to
make; and if so, it should then be plaintiffs burden to show that the responsible agency
has not in fact made that judgment with respect to the particular "defect" at issue. When
the product has been tested and approved by a federal agency, these issues can normally
be decided simply by examining the statutory assignment of the agency (including rele-
vant legislative history), the further standards adopted by the agency itself, and the rec-
ords and reports underlying its approval of the product.
Id. at 83-85, 577 P.2d at 1334-35 (Linde, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
41 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979) [hereinafter UPLL].
42 See notes 3-4 supra for examples of nongovernmental groups involved in setting stan-
dards.
13 UPLA, supra note 5, at 62,714.
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a result, many provisions of the UPLL were modified in the final
work product, the Department of Commerce Model Uniform Product
Liability Act (UPLA).44 While the UPLA retained the presumption
concerning governmental standards, it eliminated the presumption
concerning nongovernmental standards.
Section 106(e) of the UPLL provided:
A product seller may by a motion request the court to determine
whether the injury-causing aspect of the product conformed to a
non-governmental safety standard having the following characteris-
tics:
(1) It was developed through careful, thorough product testing and
a formal product safety evaluation;
(2) Consumer as well as manufacturer interests were considered in
formulating the standard;
(3) It was considered more than a minimum safety standard at the
time of its development; and
(4) The standard was up-to-date in light of the technological and
scientific knowledge reasonably available at the time the product
was manufactured.
If the court makes such a determination in the affirmative, it shall
instruct the trier of fact to presume that the product was not defec-
tive. This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence that in light of factors set forth in Sections 104(B) and (C),
the product was defective.45
Section 107 of the UPLL, the provision relating to governmental
standards, was nearly identical to section 106.46
It is clear that the process must be examined in detail to estab-
lish whether a standard possesses the four characteristics identified in
44 UPLA, supra note 5.
45 UPLL, supra note 41, § 106e), at 2999.
46 Id. § 107 provided:
(a) A product seller may by a motion request the court to determine whether the
injury-causing aspect of the product conformed to an administrative or legislative standard
having the following characteristics:
(1) It was developed as a result of careful, thorough product testing and a formal
product safety evaluation;
(2) Consumer as well as manufacturer interests were considered in formulating the
standard;
(3) The agency responsible for enforcement of the standard considered it to be more
than a minimum safety standard at the time of its promulgation; and
(4) The standard vas up-to-date in light of the technological and scientific know edge
reasonably available at the time the product %%-as manufactured.
(b) If the court makes such a determination in the affirmative. it shall instruct the
trier of fact to presume that the product %as not defective. This presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that in light of the factors set forth in Sections
104(B) and (C), the product was defective.
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sections 106 and 107 of the UPLL. By what other means could a
court determine, for example, if there had been "careful, thorough
product testing and a formal product safety evaluation"?
Although we believe that the emphasis on process is correct, two
of the authors have criticized these provisions for their failure to
provide guidelines defining good process, 4 7 require extensive
documentation of the process, 48 and establish sanctions for falsifying
documentation. 49  We expressed the following concerns with respect
to both governmental and nongovernmental standards.
The data [are] so shallow and the art of standard setting so uncer-
tain that without a clear definition with regard to what constitutes
sophisticated standard setting, we ought not to place the plaintiff in
the difficult position of rebutting a presumption by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the standard is inadequate. 50
The drafters, however, did not respond to these criticisms. In-
stead, under the UPLA, nongovernmental standards developed after
exhaustive and careful evaluation will have little legal impact on a
design defect case, 51 while governmental standards will be deemed
meaningful without regard to the process that creates them.5 2
III
PRODUCT DESIGN-FROM CONCEPT TO MARKETPLACE
Although the UPLL and Aqua Slide indicated some interest in
the process by which safety decisions are made, they did not address
the fundamental issue of how courts should evaluate designs for
which no such external safety standard exists. A process-based ap-
proach to products liability offers a solution to this problem. A court
using a process approach would not simply ask whether the inclusion
or exclusion of a particular design feature makes the product un-
reasonably dangerous. Instead, it would consider such questions as:
4' See Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the UPLL, supra note 19, at 24143 (footnotes
omitted). In that Article, we alluded to the possibility of evaluating the manufacturer's design
safety review process as well as the standard-setting process. Id.
48 Id. at 241-42.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 243.
51 See UPLA, supra note 5, § 107(c), at 62,728. The UPLA eliminated § 106(e), the process
defense. The analysis of § 107 likened adherence to a nongovernmental safety standard to fol-
lowing industry custom. The drafters believed that the varied nature of voluntary standards
prevents the standards from being accorded more weight in court. Id. at 62,728-30.
52 See UPLA, supra note 5, § 108(A), at 62,730-31. See note 18 supra for a full discussion of
this section.
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Who are the decisionmakers? At what stage of product development
was the decision made? How was the decision made? Has the de-
cisionmaking process been documented? These sorely neglected ques-
tions provide the starting point for our discussion of the process of
product design.
An example, to be discussed in the following sections of this Ar-
ticle, will help to illustrate this approach. Assume that XYZ Corpora-
tion, a manufacturer of power tools, seeks to develop a single-purpose
tool-a lightweight electric screwdriver for home use. How should
the process be structured to ensure that safety considerations are suc-
cessfully incorporated into the development of the new product?
A. The Concept Stage
A product begins as an idea born of an intended use: in our
example, to drive screws with less effort. Although safety considera-
tions also must be part of the conceptual development of the product,
the attention of the product designer is drawn first to the function of
the tool because that is the marketable aspect of the product. Safety
concerns will not rise to the forefront of design discussions unless
corporate attitudes thrust it upon product designers. Yet, the failure
to incorporate a broad range of safety considerations at the concept
stage may exclude from the process the most innovative approaches
to potential problems. If the product concept contains unacceptable
elements of danger, it should be abandoned before the manufacturer
expends significant human and financial resources to develop it.
For example, suppose that in the concept stage of the elec-
tric screwdriver's development, the manufacturer decides to use a
standard chuck to receive the screwdriver bits, without seriously con-
sidering the safety implications of that decision. The product then
progresses to the pilot line stage. When tooling is already on line,
and purchasing commitments have been made, someone realizes that
many tools made for electric drills can also be inserted into the stan-
dard chuck. The potential hazards arising from using the screwdriver
as a drill, grinder, sander, or polisher, when the basic design did not
consider these uses, are frightening.
At this stage in the product's development the only feasible
safety measure may be including an ineffective warning label with
enormous liability potential. 53 Yet, had the manufacturer recognized
5 In a failure-to-warn case, the court evaluates whether the %wrning adequately informs the
user of the high danger potential of the product. See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co.. 499
F.2d 809, 811-13 (9th Cir. 1974); Murray v. Wilson Oak Flooring Co.. 475 F.2d 129, 132-33
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this safety problem during the concept stage, it might have been able
to design a new and simple chuck that would accept only a specially
designed head on the screwdriver bits, thereby eliminating the use of
an), other tools. The new chuck might have been less expensive and
would have had the ancillary benefit of accepting only the manu-
facturer's screwdriver bits, thus ensuring a ready market for replace-
ments. On the other hand, had it become apparent during the
concept stage that a single-purpose chuck could not have been designed
within the cost limitations, the potential hazards of marketing a tool
whose use could not be controlled to ensure reasonable safety might
have led the manufacturer to abandon the project.
For the design safety review process to be effective, a broad
range of disciplines must interact, thereby allowing consideration of
all perspectives on product design that influence safety decisions.
54 It
is not possible to list all the groups that should be involved in the
safety review process because safety considerations will differ depend-
ing on the special problems inherent in each industry or product line
and because there are tens of thousands of products on the market.
An illustrative assortment of specialists who should be involved in the
safety review process includes: (1) a design engineer; (2) a marketing
representative; (3) a test engineer; (4) a service representative; (5) a
quality control engineer; (6) a production engineer; and (7) consul-
tants or specialists in areas such as human factors, psychology, and
technical writing.
(7th Cir. 1973); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1084, 1086-88 (D.C. 1976).
Even if the warning is adequate, it is still necessary to determine whether the only realistic
method of reducing the danger potential is through such a warning. A sharply worded warning
will not always absolve the manufacturer of liability. See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., - Mass.
.... • 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (1978); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions
For Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816, 844-47 (1962); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pichler,
The Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 506-07.
54 To develop this sensitivity and commitment to product safety from concept to production,
some innovative corporations have instituted safety design review procedures that begin at tle
concept stage and continue through to the prototype and production stages. See A. Weinstein,
H. Piehler, W. Donaher & A. Twerski, Final Report to National Science Foundation (NSF),
app. I, at 86 (August 1980) (Research Grant no. APR. 76-18490) [hereinafter Final Report], In
some companies, the safety assignment is delegated to a committee with special and continuing
responsibility for identifying the safety problems in the entire product line. See id. In others,
the safety aspect is part of the responsibility of those engaged in the design of a specific prod-
uct. See id. at 126, 134. Once completed, however, the design specifications usually are re-
viewed by a committee of specialists who are not members of the actual project team but ire
drawn from parallel groups within the company. See id. at 94, 111, 134-35.
The thoroughness and intensity of design safety review procedures vary significantly from
company to company. It is important to note that the documentation of the design safety review
process in the companies studied under the NSF grant did not meet the standards suggested by
the authors. See id. at 97-103, 115-21, 132-33, 145-46.
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It might appear that representatives of some of these disciplines
are unnecessary to design safety review. Why, for example, should
such a review include marketing, service, and quality control experts?
The answer is suggested in part by reference to the hypothetical elec-
tric screwdriver to be marketed for home use. If young teenagers or older
adults of both sexes comprise a significant part of the market for the
screwdriver, the manufacturer must consider the needs of these
groups in designing features such as the grip on the tool, the operat-
ing switch, accessibility, and ease of use. It is important also that the
safety review process include an evaluation of the impact of s,-fety
features on the saleability, service, or production of the product. if
the marketing division assesses the need for safety features only after
significant investment has been made in pilot line or final production
tooling, there may be fewer choices available. The serviceability of a
tool and the likelihood that it will be the subject of amateur repair
also must be assessed during the safety review process. It may be
necessary to design parts not only to be fail-safe, but to fail in such a
way that a consumer cannot repair the tool by minor tampering that
could cause the product to fail catastrophically at a later point. Qual-
ity control information must also be included in the safety review
process to ensure that the integrity of the tool is reproducible on the
production line. An assessment of the quality control necessary to
meet the desired standard for product integrity may lead to the
choice of one design alternative over another. Ultimately, these con-
frontations among disciplines put the product to the test of meeting
competing concerns within the parallel constraints of function, safety,
marketability, serviceability, and cost.
B. From Prototype to Production
The safety audit process does not end in the concept stage. The
same product safety committee should undertake similar comprehen-
sive reviews of the product at least twice more: at the prototype and
pilot line production stages of product development.
During the protbtype stage, a structured review of the design
using a failure mode and effects analysis 55 may be necessary. This
review may reveal safety problems that might arise from the failure of
A failure mode and effects analysis is a structural analytical technique that assesses the
probabilities of failure for each element of a product and traces the subsequent probabilities of
hazards or risks that can arise from each such failure. See. e.g.. S. Halpern. The Assurance
Sciences: An Introduction to Quality Control and Reliability. ch. 8 (1978). See generally B.
Armstadter, Reliability Mathematics: Fundamentals. Practices, Procedures, ohs. 9-10 t19711. N.
Enrick, Quality Control and Reliability (1972).
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product components. For example, the particular routing or attach-
ment of electrical wires within our hypothetical screwdriver may ex-
pose the wires to rubbing or loosening, either of which may cause a
shock hazard. At this point, the manufacturer must decide whether to
alter the product design or implement more stringent quality control
procedures, such as formal inspection of each product to ensure
proper routing of the wires or tightening of the terminals to minimize
the hazard. As in the concept stage, the trade-offs between a more
costly design change and a more expensive quality control procedure
can be argued and resolved more efficiently if all disciplines address
the problems concurrently.
Because safety concerns will depend on the problems inherent in
different products, it is not possible to articulate all the questions that
a safety committee must address. At a minimum, the following con-
siderations should be incorporated into the review: 56 (1) the scope of
product uses; (2) the environments within which the product will be
used; (3) the user population; (4) all possible hazards, including esti-
mates of probability of occurrence and seriousness of resulting harm;
(5) alternative design features or production techniques that could
mitigate or eliminate the hazards; (6) warnings and instructions that
could be used to minimize hazards and the manner in which these
should be formulated to be most effective; 57 and (7) evaluations of
alternative design features in light of the expected performance stan-
dards of the product. In turn, some factors relevant to this seventh
consideration are: the creation of hazards that may be associated with
a specific alternative; the effect of the alternatives on the usefulness of
the product; the effect of the alternatives on the ultimate cost of the
product; and comparison to similar products.
No one has yet formulated, nor is there likely to exist, an exact
method for measuring the importance of individual criteria or for
weighing the trade-offs. Indeed, the very process of identifying
hazards and product misuses requires basic data, experience,
brainstorming, and scenario-building by the safety review team. To
the extent that input into any part of the design process is limited
56 See A. Weinstein, A. Twerski, H. Piehler & W. Donaher, Products Liability and the
Reasonably Safe Product, ch. 10 (1978).
57 The authors' investigation into the practices of product safety committees in major corpo-
rations reveals a surprising lack of attention paid to the effective formulation of warnings and
instructions. Usually the task is left to a technical writer and reviewed by the project engineer,
neither of whom is representative of the person who will use the product. There Is no actual
testing of the comprehension levels of the persons who will use the product, and there is no
analysis of the literature available from educational sources. See Final Report, supra note 54, at
121-22.
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and narrow, the process will reflect that shallowness. Thus, good
process implies not only a structure of decisionmaking but also com-
prehensive evaluation of all safety considerations.
IV
DOCUMENTATION
Product safety review on an ad hoc, product-by-product basis
probably will continue to be the manufacturer's approach to product
safety. The strength of this approach is that it permits an in-depth
and free-flowing inquiry into product safety. Because the process has
so little formal structure, however, the nature of the decisionmaking
and the reasons for the decisions should be readily accessible.
Documentation serves this purpose in several ways. First, it allows
the design safety review group to examine its risk-utility formulation
at a later stage of product development when field-use information on
the product is available. The group can, thus, monitor the efficacy of
the decisionmaking process and fine-tune the process, thereby per-
mitting its use by subsequent safety review groups and other profes-
sional staffs not directly involved in the task of review. Second,
documentation aids reevaluations of the initial decisionmaking proc-
ess, which may be triggered by serious complaints about a product.
Third, documentation is a valuable source of decisionmaking informa-
tion for industry-wide discussion 58 on the development, utilization,
and refinement of in-house product safety review methodology. 59
Admittedly, there are some dangers to documenting the design
process. The potentially damaging impact of documenting safety
trade-offs is readily apparent in light of the adversarial nature of
58 Conducting such discussions should not expose manufacturers to liability under the anti-
trust laws. The industry-wide exchange of nonprice data sometimes can constitute an unreaon-
able restraint of trade, see L. Sullivan. Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 97. at 274 (1977).
and exchange of safety review methodology could, if it engendered unirormity of safety features.
remove one element of product differentiation. Unless a clear anticompetitive effect could be
demonstrated, however, the safety benefits of the exchange should suffice to protect the ex-
change under rule of reason analysis. In the context of vertical restraints on resale. practices
more overtly anticompetitive than exchanges of product safety review data. the Supreme Court
has stated that restraints designed to promote product safety can be approved if they have no
anticompetitive effect and.., they are reasonably ancillary to the sellers main purpose of
protecting the public from harm or itself from product liability.- National Soey of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679. 696 n.22 (1978) (dictum); accord. Tripoli Co. v. Wella
Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 938 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 400 U.S. 831 (1970); see Continental T.V..
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977).
59 See A. Weinstein, A. Twerski, H. Piehler & W. Donaher. supra note 56. at 142-44 for a
discussion of the documentation appropriate to the design review process.
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products liability litigation. 60 A manufacturer may fear that introduc-
ing such documents would unduly influence a jury if a manufac-
turer considered and then rejected safety features that would have
caused a significant increase in costs while providing little additional
safety. Furthermore, since safety features and the response to them
are a matter of intense competition in many industries, a mamufac-
turer may fear that disclosure of decisionmaking documents would
threaten its product's marketability. 61 The risk of both liability ex-
posure and increased competition may seem sufficiently great to ren-
der the idea of documenting all stages of product safety decisions an
idealistic dream of ivory tower academics.
Yet, the risks of failing to record the process are even greater.
The lack of meaningful data seriously hampers the investigation of
product-related injuries by agencies or by industry itself. Although
government's attempts to gather more data and make it available to
industry 62 are worthwhile, raw data alone will not make corporate
60 The recent criminal prosecution of the Ford Motor Company in Indiana for defective
design of the gasoline tank of the Pinto is the most publicized example of the use of in-house
memoranda to damn a company for having made a cost-related safety decision. See State v.
Ford Motor Co., No. 79-5324 (Ind. Super. Ct., filed Feb. 2, 1979). The information gleaned
from one memorandum which first surfaced in civil litigation in California revealed that Ford
had known of the crashworthiness problems of the Pinto but had retained its original design
because of cost factors. See Grimsbaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-77-61 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Feb. 6, 1978).
61 In camera inspection or protective orders, however, may be used to protect trade secrets.
See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
62 Many federal regulatory statutes provide for the reporting of raw data concerning safety-
related defects. See, e.g., 16 C:F.R. pt. 1605 (1980) (regulation promulgated under Flammable
Fabrics Act of 1953); 33 C.F.R. pt. 179 (1979) (regulation promulgated under Federal Boat Safety
Act of 1971); 49 C.F.R. pt. 573 (1979) (regulation promulgated under National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966). The Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 mandates the establish-
ment of an Injury Information Clearinghouse to assemble and analyze injury data. 15 U.S.C. §
2054(a) (1976).
The most significant aspect of the Clearinghouse is the National Electronic Injury Surveil-
lance System (NEISS). NEISS is a computerized data collection system connected to a largo
number of hospital emergency rooms throughout the United States. When an injury attributable
to a consumer product is treated at one of these emergency rooms, the information is compiled
along with details about the type of product involved and the severity of the injury. The CPSC
Bureau of Epidemiology also performs in-depth studies on product categories that appear to
.create major hazards.
Yet, despite such available data, few agencies require interpretive or evaluative reports.
One agency that appears to require such reporting is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976). This section has a definite emphasis on process. Many of the
reasons for rejecting a new drug application turn on determination by the FDA that the appli-
cant has not performed adequate testing of the drug, has used inadequate methods in manufac-
ture and packing, or has not fully documented the test results. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1976);
Ubiotica Corp. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1970) (rejecting application for new drug for
treatment of mongolism). Conclusions drawn from the drug area, however, for the most part do
not apply to the products field as a whole. The research pattern for drugs is more settled and
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decisionmakers more responsive to safety hazards. Such responsive-
ness depends on decisionmakers' having access to the interpretive
reasoning of those who have translated sparse data into design
changes, access that depends in turn on careful documentation of the
decisionmaldng process. It is simply folly to sacrifice the most sig-
nificant source of safety information -carefully documented risk-
utility product design analysis-because of concerns about business
competition and liability exposure.
A second consideration compels comprehensive risk-utility
documentation of the design process. Although documentation may
be expensive for the manufacturer in the short run, we believe that
in the long run documentation of the safety review process will re-
duce costs. As a practical matter, the onus of product design justifica-
tion in products liability cases is now on the manufacturer. 6' Those
has greater acceptability in the scientific community than the research pattern for most other
products. See Shapo, Public Regulation of Dangerous Products. ch. 6 (1980). See generally
Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturers Liability. 18 Rutgers L Rev.
947(1964). TheToxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629(1976), regulates the manufactur-
ing of chemical substances and mixtures, id. § 2601, and mandates documentation and reporting oftest
data concerning new chemical substances or mixtures, id. §§ 2604(a), (b), 2607(a-d see 44 Fed. Reg.
59,763 (1979) (proposed rule).
6 In Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443. 455. 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 237-38 (1978), the Supreme Court of California shifted the formal burden of proof from the
injured plaintiff to the manufacturer to demonstrate that a product is not defective in design
after the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing that the product's design had proximately
caused his injury. The courts position has engendered vociferous criticism. See. e.g., Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 411, 413, 579 P.2d 1287, 1287 (1978); Epstein. supra note 1. at
650-52; Keeton, Products Liability- Design Hazards, supra note 1, at M-11.
One should not be blinded by the Barker burden-of-prof controversy to the realities of
design defect litigation. Even without a formal shift of the burden of proof. practicality demands
that the manufacturer come forward with evidence of design justification. Professor Gary
Schwartz has described the pre-Barker trial procedure as follows:
[T]he plaintiff introduced evidence establishing the existence of a feasible design alterna-
tive that would have prevented his injury. At this point, whatever the law said. some
juries expected the manufacturer to introduce whatever evidence it possessed showing
that the plaintiffs design proposal would not have been a good idea-that it would have
been too costly, would have unduly interfered with the products performance, would
have created additional safety hazards, or whatever. The jury's expectation in this regard
obviously grew out of its intuitive perception of the sound access-to-information burden-
of-proof criterion. Yet since the resulting practice also spared the manufacturer the obliga-
tion of proving a negative, it equally complied with the other valid criterion. Also, it
avoided any overburdening of the proximate cause concept. So long as judges are willing
to enter directed verdicts when the manufacturcrs trade-off evidence is strong enough.
this... pre-Barker practice seems an intelligent, balanced solution to the burden-of-
proof problem ... .[T]he Barker rule should be either modified or "interpreted" to
provide for its legalization. That is, once the plaintiff identifies a feasible design alterna-
tive which would have prevented his injury, the responsibility should rest on the man-
ufacturer to show why that alternative would not have been risk-beneficial.
Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability. supra note 1. at 470-71 (footnotes omit-
ted).
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manufacturers able both to document the complexities of design deci-
sions and to demonstrate the sensitivity and intelligence of their de-
cisionmaking processes generally have fared well at trial.0 4 Thus,
information evidencing careful deliberation is not only a sword for use
against the manufacturer but also a shield against the costs of liability
arising from improvident decisions.
Furthermore, the manufacturing community is concerned with
government's moving from generic standard-setting to addressing it-
self to the details of individual product design and quality control.
The spectre of this kind of governmental involvement already has
caused great consternation. 65 To counter such official involvement,
industry will have to demonstrate that its method of design evaluation
has integrity. It will have to document the details of its decisionmak-
ing process and demonstrate that it is attacking design problems with
thoroughness and integrity. Government may not be satisfied with
the results in every instance, but it is not likely to intrude for mar-
ginal gains. If, however, government is not convinced that the proc-
ess is thorough, it will impose additional regulations that are both
detailed and restrictive. Although documentation may pose im-
mediate risks to manufacturers, in the long run both manufacturers
and consumers will benefit from documentation of safety standard-
setting that reveals the data, its interpretation, and the reasons for
the decisionmaking.
One matter is certain. Unless the process of data interpretation is
revealed, we shall gain precious little from the data that is vital to
standard-setting. Industry will lack the data it needs to design the
best new products or to redesign existing products. Governmental
standard-setters will not, except in rare instances, be able to amass
the resources to duplicate efforts of the private sector. Thus, if industry,
under current standards of products liability law, fails to be suffi-
ciently attentive to process, we must either provide a mechanism for
revealing the decisionmaking and interpretive processes of the private
sector or reconcile ourselves to the present system in which product
judgments and safety standards are made largely in the dark.
6 See, e.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 99-101, 103-04 (5th Cir. 1978)
(defendant manufacturer of a power saw presented extensive documentation that the product
exceeded industry safety practices as well as national and associational safety standards, that
very few other manufacturers included such a guard in their designs, that no manufacturer
produced a saw with a permanently affixed guard, and that a permanently affixed guard would
undermine the saw's usefulness); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 19-23, 484 P.2d
47, 53-63 (1971) (defendant manufacturer of earth-moving equipment presented highly technical
and thorough documentation that other manufacturers were using similar designs; that a safer
and feasible design was unknown; and that there had been adequate testing of the product).
65 See note 17 supra.
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INDUSTRY, VOLUNTARY, AND
GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDS
The standards set by governmental agencies,", private groups, 67
and trade associations 68 provide basic guidelines for product design
for many major manufacturers. Even more importantly, smaller mem-
bers of particular industries tend to rely on these standards as both
minimum and maximum requirements for their products. Signifi-
candy, design defect litigation often calls attention to these standards. 69
If the emphasis on process is correct, the standard-setting
mechanisms of both governmental and private institutions will require
the sort of scrutiny suggested above for industry.7 The process of
decisionmaking in the development of these standards will have to
be documented so that its comprehensiveness and integrity can be
evaluated and its efficacy judged. If a manufacturer-particularly a
small one with little capacity for in-house design review-relies on
3uch a standard and injury nevertheless results from a risk addressed
by the standard, the ensuing litigation must focus on the efficacv of
the standard itself. Unless those responsible for setting the standard
come forward to demonstrate the comprehensiveness and integrity of
the process by which the standard was developed, no determination
of the issue of design defect can be made.
The same fears that motivate industry, to bury its deliberative
process 71 may, of course, affect private standard-setting groups and
trade associations. If these groups and associations are to be a major
source of standards for product litigation, however, they will have to
reveal their decisionmaking processes. The fear that industn" domina-
66 See note 2 supra.
67 See note 3 supra.
6s See note 4 supra.
69 See Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566 F.2d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 1978) (standards of Flamma-
ble Fabrics Act); Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 630-31. 549 P..d 1353. 13S9 (1976)
(standards of National Fire Protection Association); Heise v. J.R. Clark Co.. 245 Minn 179.
184, 71 NAV.2d 818, 822 (1955) (rules of American Standard Safety Code); McDaniel v McNeil
Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 199-201, 241 N.W.2d 822. 828 (1976) (standards of FDA).
Crammer v. Kohlhaas Tank & Equip. Co., 93 N.M. 685. 659-90. 604 P.2d 823, 827-2.8, 839
(1979) (standards of American Society of Mechanical Engineers); Valentine v. Conchemco. Inc..
588 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (standards of national Electrical Code). See gener-
ally Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation. 41 Notre Dame
Law. 1, 7-10 (1965) (admissibility in evidence of safety codes, standards, and practices in negli-
gence actions).
70 For the legal effect currently given to governmental standards in products liability litiga-
tion, see discussion note 18 supra.
71 See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
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tion will merely perpetuate self-interest can be dispelled only by a
process that involves a balanced and informed consensus and is given
a high degree of visibility,.
Even if standard-setters employ good procedures, however, they
cannot provide an adequate substitute for well-developed and well-
articulated in-house product safety review process. Externally set
standards, whether established by government or voluntary
standard-setting organizations, cannot focus on the full set of specific
design considerations that industry uses to evaluate each aspect of a
proposed product design. We do not mean to imply that governmen-
tal or voluntary standard-setting agencies that address generic issues
of design safety do not play an important role. On the contrary, such
external standard-setters will continue to be helpful in developing a
baseline for product safety, but external standards cannot address all
the risks posed by individual product designs. Moreover, broad stan-
dards tend to stifle ingenuity and creativity. Thus, although the indi-
vidualized products will have to conform to agency standards, product
safety must depend primarily on encouraging manufacturers to estab-
lish and carefully document their in-house product safety review
processes.
VI
THE PROCESS LIABILITY PROPOSAL
The proposed legislative and judicial approaches to controlling
design defect litigation have failed to recognize the central impor-
tance of encouraging good risk-reduction decisions. Instead, these
proposals have focused on either excluding certain cases from the liti-
gation process entirely 72 or providing manufacturers with additional
defenses or presumptions of no defect that do not bear any relation-
72 For example, statutes of repose place an outside limit on the number of years from time
of manufacture or sale within which a products liability action can be brought. See, e.g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551 (Supp. 1957-1979); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979);
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1979); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977); UPLA,
supra note 5, § 110(B), at 62,732.
Our proposal differs sharply from that of Professor Henderson, who suggests that all con-
scious design choice cases be removed from the litigation scene. See Henderson, Judicial Re
view of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices, supra note 1, at 1534. We took issue with
the Henderson thesis, contending that the fact that the design choice was conscious did not
mean that safety was a significant factor in the manufacturer's decisionmaking. Twerskl,
Weinstein, Donaher & Piebler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 528. Our
proposal demands that a court be fully apprised of whether a comprehensive review was central
to product development. Absent such a perspective we see no reason for absolving a defendant
of the consequences of its design choices.
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ship to risk-reduction. 73 The plaintiffs' bar and consumer groups
have attacked such proposals as unjust infringements of a process that
has improved product safety. 74 Indeed, the proposals offer no
guidance to manufacturers concerning the quality of their product de-
cisions.
Our solution is not to remove some design defect cases from the
courts, but instead to enable manufacturers to focus judicial inquiry
on their decisionmaking processes. Under our proposal, a manufac-
turer could raise either a traditional defense or a defense based on
process. Under a traditional defense, a manufacturer would argue that
the challenged design feature was reasonable. The plaintiff's legal
burden then would be to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the design was defective. Alternatively, we would allow
the defendant to reveal his entire safety review process. If the court
determines that this process properly accounted for safety considera-
tions, the resulting design is deemed presumptively nondefective.
Such a presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the design is
in fact defective. To assure the manufacturer whose process has integ-
rity that close design decisions will not find their way to the jury, the
plaintiff would be able to rebut the presumption only by producing
clear and convincing evidence. 75
7 Examples of such defenses and presumptions include: (1) a state of the art defense limit-
ing a manufacturer's responsibility to safety features available or in use at the time of manufac-
ture or sale, see note 10 supra and UPLA, supra note 5, § 107, at 62,728-29; (2) compliance vith
statutory standard as a defense to a design defect case, see note 10 supra; (3) a defense for
unforeseeable misuse, see note 10 supra; and (4) a rebuttable presumption of no defect or a
defense when there is unforeseeable alteration by someone other than the defendant, see notes
10-11 supra.
74 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business on Product
Liability Problems Affecting Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1534-97 (1976) (statement of
Ralph Nader); Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Products liability
Crisis, 14 Forum 251, 271-86 (1978); Johnson, supra note 5. at 680-92.
75 A judge will direct a verdict for the defendant if the plaintiff falls to produce sufficient
evidence such that a reasonable juror could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
design was defective. See IMIcCormicks Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 3S. at 789-90 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972).
The burden placed on the plaintiff wvill be twofold. The plaintiff must go foriard with dear
and convincing evidence and must persuade the jury by clear and convincing evidence. The
first burden is that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particuLar fact in issue.
The second is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true. See
id. § 337, at 783-84. One might ask why we are changing the required level of proof if
we are really attempting to alter the standard of liability. Our answer to this question is
based on the extensive criticism concerning the difficulties in defining gross negligence and in
distinguishing gross negligence from negligence. See W. Prosser, supra note 18. § 34, at 182;
Green, High Care and Gross Negligence, 23 Il1. L. Rev. 4, 11. 17-29 (1928). Rather than
adding to the existing confusion surrounding the definition of design defect by creating a stan-
dard of "gross" design defect, we have chosen to raise the evidentiary standard.
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As our criticisms of the UPLL indicate, 76 process considerations
should not be integrated into products liability law unless there is a
clear understanding of the contours of good process. We have, there-
fore, discussed the stages of product design and the considerations
that the manufacturer should take into account at each stage. 77 To
meet our good-process standards, a defendant would have to show
that the safety review process was thorough; that it analyzed the
product at each critical stage of design; that it involved interaction
among all the essential disciplines; that it honestly considered all rel-
evant information and data; and that it carefully documented the en-
tire process including the rationales for decisions on safety-related
product features. 78
Our proposal is both fair to and demanding of manufacturers. If
the manufacturer decides to use the process defense, he must be
willing to open his files completely to judicial scrutiny. Documenta-
tion at every stage of the decisionmaking process is essential since it
provides the interpretive data for understanding design decisions.
It may appear at first blush that we are recreating the burden-of-proof problem spawned by
Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432-33, 573 P.2d 443, 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237
(1978), in which the California Supreme Court held that once the plaintiff makes a prima facle
showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product design, the burden shifts to the
defendant to establish that its product was reasonably safe. Professor Gary Schwartz has taken
the Barker court to task on this point. He contends:
The heart of the problem is this: one simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-benefit
defect in a product design until and unless one has identified some design alternative
(including any design omission) that can serve as the basis for a risk-benefit analysis. If the
Barker rule is read literally, however, it fails to require the plaintiff even to point to an
alternative of this sort. Within the burden-of-proof jurisprudence, one respected canon Is
that the burden should be placed on the party who has control of or access to the relevant
information; this is the canon upon which Barker properly relies. But another respectable
canon is that the burden of proof should not be placed so as to require a party to prove a
negative. This canon the Barker rule violates.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 468 (footnotes omitted).
By requiring the defendant to establish a comprehensive process, our proposal might be
read to require the manufacturer to negative every possibility of defect in the entire product.
Admittedly, requiring the defendant to establish every aspect of the process with regard to
every feature of the product would impose a heavy burden on the defendant. Our proposal,
however, does not require such an undertaking. The manufacturer is not required to prove a
negative, but only to convince the court of the comprehensiveness of the process and demon-
strate how the process led to the particular design decision in question. Process thus is a de-
fense to a specifically focused allegation of design defect. We suggest that the process defense
presented in this paper may, in fact, provide a rational reading of the Barker opinion itself. The
thrust of the defense is to require the defendant to explain risk-utility trade-offs by going
beyond the narrow focus of the immediate design decision to affirmative proof of the integrity of
the design process.
16 See Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the UPLL, supra note 19, at 241-43; text accom-
panying notes 47-50 supra.
"' See pp. 365-69 supra.
78 See pp. 369-72 supra.
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Additionally, the requirement that every stage of the process be
documented provides a safeguard against abuse of the process ap-
proach. Other safeguards against abuse could include punitive dam-
ages for falsifying documentation. 79
We have created a presumption that would shift both the pro-
duction and persuasion burdens to the plaintiff after the manufacturer
demonstrates good process because we believe that good process
promotes good design decisions. A manufacturer that considers the
full range of design alternatives is more likely to select the best de-
sign because it is more likely to be aware of potential hazards as-
sociated with any particular product. Unless a hazard is justified by
increased utility, the manufacturer will choose a design that avoids
that hazard. And the very circumstances under which a design would
be so justified are those in which a risk-utility analysis probably
would find the product nondefective.
The analysis of process that we propose is only in a limited sense
a test of the manufacturer's conduct. If the process fails the test, for
whatever reason, the product may or may not be unreasonably
dangerous as decided by the jury on the basis of the alleged defect.
When the process is valid, however, its validity rests not so much on
the reasonableness of the specific design feature chosen, but on the
fact that the process focused precisely on the premise of strict
liability-considering the product in the real environment of its use.
If we are correct in our belief that good process promotes good
design decisions, bad process should produce poor design decisions.
Thus, evidence of bad process should create a presumption of defect.
Although an in-depth analysis of the plaintiff's use of process is
beyond the scope of this Article, the possibilities range from a permis-
sible inference to a rebuttable presumption of defect that would shift
the burdens of production and persuasion.
One further issue must be addressed: we believe that judges
applying our proposal should reserve to themselves the question
whether the manufacturer's process is sufficient to raise a presumption
of no defect. Although this is not mandated by the process proposal,
we believe there are compelling reasons supporting determination of
the process defense by judges.
If the process proposal is to succeed in encouraging better risk-
reduction decisions, we must provide manufacturers with specific
guidelines on what constitutes good process. Feedback on the specific
elements of good process with respect to particular products or indus-
79 See generally Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages. 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 303 (1980).
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tries is important to ensure that manufacturers establish good safety
review processes. A general jury verdict provides none of this infor-
mation, and special interrogatories and special verdicts have been
criticized on the ground that they may produce inconsistent re-
sults.8 0 The prospect of inconsistent results is especially problematic
in light of our goal of giving manufacturers guidance on how to style
their safety review processes. A judge could, however, provide man-
ufacturers with feedback by writing detailed findings and conclusions
which would not pose the problem of inconsistent results.
There is another compelling reason for submitting the process
defense to the judge. The purpose of the process presumption is to
encourage manufacturers to adopt careful procedures for reviewing
product safety. But if evidence regarding the manufacturer's full
range of safety decisions is heard before the jury, such evidence may
prejudice the jury's consideration of design questions. The threat of
such prejudice could lead manufacturers to adopt a traditional de-
fense, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the new defense.
The problem may be illustrated by returning to our hypothetical
screwdriver. 81 Assume that the screwdriver is equipped with a slide
switch to turn the tool on and off. This switch does not require the
user to apply continuous pressure. Assume further that a purchaser of
a screwdriver is injured when he drops the screwdriver and it
continues to turn. The plaintiff will try to prove the availability of
alternative designs that would have reduced the risk of injury; any
alternative that was clearly infeasible, however, would be irrelevant
to the question of defective design and therefore would not be admis-
sible into evidence. Nonetheless, consideration of such an alternative
is relevant to the issue of good process. For example, the manufac-
turer may have considered providing a spring-loaded pushbutton
switch, which requires continuous pressure, to reduce the risk of in-
jury. After careful evaluation, the manufacturer may have rejected
this option for a combination of reasons, including long-term perform-
ance, use by older people, ease of repair, cost, and quality control
concerns. Although evidence that the manufacturer evaluated infeasi-
ble alternatives is an integral part of demonstrating good process, it is
not relevant to proving defective design. And, although a jury could
be instructed to ignore evidence of the rejection of the safety device
when deciding the design defect issue, there is a risk that this evi-
80 See Hand v. United States, 441 F.2d 529, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1971); Missouri Pac. R.R.
v. Salazar, 254 F.2d 847, 847-48 (5th Cir. 1958); Note, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 Yale L.J. 484, 498-501 (1965).
81 See p. 365 supra.
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dence would influence the jury in its decision on design defect. This
would be especially prejudicial if the manufacturer rejected the alter-
native as infeasible because it was too costly.
To further illustrate this problem, assume that an adult suffers an
injury that could have been avoided by use of a specific safety device.
In addition, assume that during the concept stage the manufacturer
considered marketing the screwdriver for use by children. Although a
risk-utility analysis conducted at that stage indicated that the safety
device should be included in the product design, the manufacturer
decided not to employ the device when it rejected the idea of mar-
keting the screwdriver for use by children. Again, these decisions
would be revealed if the manufacturer unveiled its decisionmaking
process; they may not be relevant, however, to a decision concerning
the reasonableness of the ultimate design-a screwdriver marketed
for use by adults. Nonetheless, the risk of influencing the jury in its
resolution of the design defect question might deter the manufacturer
from raising the process defense. To avoid the unfair prejudice that
could result from permitting the jury to hear such process evidence,
judges should decide the process defense.8 2
82 We believe the judge's determination of the process defense does not offend the parties'
right to a jury trial, as guaranteed by the seventh amendment. see U.S. Const. amend. VII.
most state constitutions, e.g., Conn. Const. art. I, § 19; Me. Const. art. 1, § -if0 S.D. Cost.
art. VI, § 6; see 50 C.J.S. Juries § 10a (1947 & Cum. Supp. 1980); F. James & C. Hazard, Civil
Procedure 347 (2d ed. 1977), and some state statutes and rules, see, e.g,, Colo. R.C.P. 39;
Wyo. R.C.P. 38.
Submitting the process defense to the judge is consistent with the general tendency of
judicial control in design defect litigation. Professor Wade has argued that design defect cases
fall in the middle of the spectrum between cases involving strict liability for abnormally danger-
ous activities and negligence cases. Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 83S.39; see
Phillips v. Kimwod Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493-501, 525 P.2d 1033. 1039-40 (1974); Rc.h v.
Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 461-65 525 P.2d 125, 127-29 (1974). The decision that an activity is
abnormally dangerous is made by the judge as a matter of law because social policy issues are
involved in the determination that an entire class of activity falls outside the fault system. See
Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 838. See generally Restatement (Second) ofTorts §
520 (comment 1) (1977). However, in negligence cases, the jury decides the issue of standard of
care, a more factual determination which does not involve the same balancing of policy con-
cerns. See Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 838. Professor Wade argues that policy
issues become important in design defect cases because they involve the classification ofa whole
group or type of products as unsafe due to the nature of the design. See id. Wade also distin-
guishes between design defect cases and production defect cases, arguing that production defect
cases present more factual issues, do not involve broad social policy concerns, and are thus
more suitable for jury determination. See id. On the other hand, Proressor Wade argues, design
defect cases lean more toward the abnormal activity side of the spectrum than toward the
negligence side. See id. Therefore, in considering policy issues to decide w'hether the case
should be submitted to the jury, judges exercise greater control over design defect cases by
restricting the number of decisions they submit to the jury. See id. at 833-39.
The process determination itself is appropriately made by the judge because it involves a
conclusion of law, and the right to a jury trial is implicated only when issues or fact are kept
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In short, this proposal trades a relaxed standard of liability
regarding the quality of design decisions for a higher standard of
accountability in the decisionmaking process. The close-call choice
among design alternatives will be removed from the jury because of
our belief that such choices made by a manufacturer in the context of
a process that has integrity are, in fact, reasonable. Decisions that are
the product of such a rigorous process should not be subjected to the
roll of the dice in the jury room.
VII
IMPLICATIONS OF A PROCESS-BASED THEORY
Although this Article has concentrated on developing a process
defense for design defect litigation, a process approach has interesting
implications for failure-to-warn and production defect cases.
A. Failure-to-Warn Cases
It is questionable whether the process defense should be avail-
able when a plaintiff contends that a product is defective because it
from the jury. In a negligence suit, it is proper for the jury to determine whether a defendant
was negligent since that determination entails an examination of the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's actions. The process defense, however, is not made by reference to the hypothetical
reasonable man standard, which is a "personification of a community ideal of reasonable be-
havior, determined by the jury's social judgment." W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 32, at 151; see
pp. 364-71, 373-75 supra. Indeed, it is conceivable that the manufacturer could act reasonably
although the process is legally insufficient to satisfy the process standard. Furthermore, the
effect of the process determination is to set the plaintiff's burden of proof, a matter traditionally
decided by the judge. Upon a finding of good process, the plaintiff is required to satisfy the
higher burden of clear and convincing evidence, which replaces the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
Although this is not absolutely necessary to the process defense, we suggest that the
judge also decide the factual issues necessary to making the process determination. If the jury
were to hear evidence admissible only for the purpose of determining process, the jury might
be prejudiced in its determination of design defect. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
Furthermore, in order to provide manufacturers with guidance in designing their safety review
processes, the jury would have to render special verdicts or answer special interrogatories, But
these devices often produce inconsistent results which would thwart the goal of providing feed-
back. See cases cited in note 80 supra and accompanying text. For other areas of law in which
judges decide factual issues in order to make a legal determination, see, e.g., Sinclair v. Spate
Co., 452 F.2d 1213, 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 (1972) (judge may determine
facts necessary to ruling on existence of diversity of citizenship); United States v. Ceaney, 417
F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1969) (judge may determine preliminary
issue of admissibility of evidence in conspiracy case even though it coincides with the ultimate
issue of the defendant's guilt); Matz v. United States, 158 F.2d 190, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (In
bigamy prosecution, judge may determine whether first marriage was established for purposes
of ruling on competency of second wife to testify); Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
57 F.R.D. 165, 169-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (judge may determine preliminary issues of fact on
which choice of law depends).
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does not carry an adequate warning of the risks entailed in its use.
Since the allegation is that the defendant had knowledge of a risk but
did not share that information with consumers, a strong argument can
be made for judging the reasonableness of the decision not to warn
and prohibiting the use of the process defense. In general, the
failure-to-warn problem is less polycentric8 3 and less amenable to the
argument that good faith trade-offs made by the manufacturer in
close-call cases should not be a predicate of liability if the process has
met the suggested standards.
Failure-to-warn cases in which the function of a warning is not to
reduce the incidence of risk among consumers but to inform consum-
ers of a nonreducible risk clearly should not be subject to the process
defense.84 Such cases do not pose polycentric risk-utility considera-
tions but rather public policy questions concerning the consumers
right to choose the risk level at which he wishes to live. This is a
societal decision based on values that stand apart from the formal
design process. Use of the process defense would, therefore, be inap-
propriate. 85
B. Production Defect-Design Defect-A Mirage
A process orientation that probes into the risk-reduction deci-
sions made by manufacturers and the choices available to them raises
serious questions about the soundness of the sharp distinction drawn
between production and design defects.8 6  To prevail in a production
s3 See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers" Conscious Design Choices, supra note
1, at 1559 n.121. Although in a rebuttal article the authors demonstrated that even warnings
could raise polycentric issues, the thrust of our argument was that warnings had to be viewed as
part of the overall design decision. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pichler. The Use and Abuse
of Warnings, supra note 1, at 513-17. It is quite a different question whether the failure-to-%arn
claim should be subject to the process defense.
84 We have analogized such failure-to-warn cases to informed consent cases. See Twerski,
Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings. supra note 1. at 517-21.
85 On the other hand, some of the authors believe that risk-reduction failure-to-iarn
cases-as distinguished from cases involving warnings that do not reduce risks-should be
subject to the process defense. The argument in favor of providing the process defense is that
risk-reduction warnings must be balanced against design alternatives and thus should be ad-
dressed by the process of product development. A process defense could demonstrate the care-
ful consideration of the interplay between design and warning alternatives. To sever the two
might cripple the process defense in these cases.
11 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engr Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413. 417-18. 573 P.2d 443. 446-47, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 228-29 (1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland Engr Co., 76 N.J. 152. 169-70, 356 A.2d
816, 824 (1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485. 491. 525 P.2d 1033. 1035-36
(1974); UPLA, supra note 5, § 104(A), (B), at 62,721. Henderson. Judicial Review of Manufactur-
ers' Conscious Design Choices, supra note 1. at 1542-43. But see Phillips. The Standard for
Determining Defectiveness, supra note 1, at 103-05; Weinstein, Twerskd. Pichler & Donaher,
Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology. 12 Duq. L. Rev. 425. 432-33 & n.14
(1974).
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defect case, a plaintiff need establish only that the product was defec-
tive in comparison to the nondefective products that come off of the
assembly line. It is no defense that the cost to the manufacturer of
improving quality control would be prohibitive. 87 On the other
hand, the design defect case requires a risk-utility analysis in order to
arrive at the conclusion that the product is unreasonably dangerous.
There is cause for concern that the structure of the law, which
mandates strict liability for a production defect arising from quality
control procedures but which permits risk-utility balancing for a de-
sign defect, might be counterproductive to risk-reduction. Given a
choice between raising quality control standards and altering the de-
sign, a -manufacturer might be led by the law to the wrong risk-
reduction decision.
Assume that by rerouting the wires in the electric screwdriver,88
the manufacturer could accomplish a design change that would elimi-
nate the shock hazard present in the original design but that would
create a different remote hazard, one that did not exist in the original
design. Assume further that the estimated probability of injury from
this remote hazard is 2 in every 100,000 uses. Alternatively, the
manufacturer finds that by increasing quality control standards the
shock level of the original design hazard could be reduced to 1 in
every 100,000 uses. Despite the lower level of risk that would result
from improved quality control, the manufacturer might choose a de-
sign change that gives it a risk-utility defense rather than a change in
quality control standards which is not defensible on risk-utility
grounds. Thus, it may be that the bases of legal liability are not
synonymous with overall risk-reduction. If the soft (risk-utility) deci-
sion is easier to defend than the hard (quality control) decision, the
manufacturer may be induced to choose the cosmetically attractive,
albeit somewhat questionable, design alteration decision. Under cur-
rent litigation practice, such a decision would not be revealed and
would not be not open to challenge in the courts.
Another example of this phenomenon is the manufacturer's deci-
sion to increase the quality of his product by raising design standards.
As a trade-off, the manufacturer might reduce his quality control
standard under the theory that even a product that fails to meet the
manufacturer's higher standard is still comparable to the standard of
the industry with regard to that product part. If the part fails, is the
manufacturer to be held to his higher design standard merely because
87 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1977).
88 See p. 365 supra.
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the product failed?"9  In many instances in which a product fhils as a
result of a production defect, the plaintiff may have a claim based on
disapointed consumer expectations. 90 The consumer may have
purchased from a particular manufacturer because the quality of his
product surpasses industry standards. There are, however, situations
in which consumers have no clear expectations concerning specific
qualities of a product. 91  For example, the maker of a quality au-
tomobile could design and utilize a ball joint that fails when hitting a
pothole at 65 mph. The industry standard might be 30 mph. Assume
that because of a production defect, the ball joint on the quality au-
tomobile fails at 50 mph. Customers probably have no expectations of
the conditions under which a ball joint meets or exceeds industry
standards. There would seem to be no basis for imposing liability
merely because the product did not meet the manufacturer's own
superior standards.
It is clear that the manufacturer's choice between a design
change or an increase in quality control standards should be made on
the basis of sensible risk-reduction. The distinction between defect
types exists in the minds of legal scholars. Engineers just do not think
in those terms.
89 In a different context, the authors of the UPLA tried to respond to this argument. See
UPLA, supra note 5, § 104(A) Analysis, at 62,722, 62,723.
90 See Barker v. Lull Engr Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-32. 573 P.2d 443. 454-56. 143 Cal.
Rptr..2-2, 236-38 (1978); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830. 835-36 (loan
1978); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145. 154, 542 P.2d 774. 779 (1975).
The process defense is not applicable when the plaintiff alleges a production defect based
on the product's failure to meet consumer expectations. In such cases, the test for liability is not
contingent on risk-utility analysis. In these cases, the consumer expectation test posits a stan-
dard of liability that has its origins in values other than sensible risk-reduction. When the focus
of attention is on the product, however, and not on consumer expectations. the entire de-
cisionmaking process must be examined carefully before concluding that liability automatically
follows when an injury is caused by the product's failure to meet the manufacturcrs internal
standards.
The same reasoning applies to the use of the consumer expectation test in design defect
cases in which risk-utility considerations do not play a role in judging defective design. Some
commentators, however, have argued that the defendant should be permitted to rebut the in-
ference of defective design based on the product's failure to meet consumer expectations by
demonstrating that the design met risk-utility guidelines and wvas not unreasonably dangerous.
See Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards, supra note 1, at 310; Schiartz, supra note 1.
at 453-54. If one agrees with the argument that risk-utility factors should be considered as a
defense in design defect cases based on the product's failure to meet consumer expectations, the
process defense should be applicable in these cases also.
91 See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 472-73. 435 P.2d 806. 803-09 (197)
(truck's collision with rocks is sufficiently beyond the average person's experience for jury to
decide what an ordinary consumer would expect); UPLA, supra note 5. § 104{B) Analysis. at
62,724; Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 19, at 829 (consumer cannot form expectation
when he does not knov how safe a product can be made).
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CONCLUSION
It is with considerable trepidation that we suggest a defense to a
products liability action based on evidehce that the decisionmaking
process was comprehensive and well-articulated. The obvious ques-
tions that will be raised are: If the process was so good, why did the
product cause injury? Does not the fact that the product caused an
injury in a design defect case demonstrate that safety dimensions
were not properly considered? The answer to these questions is that
there are cases in the middle range of product liability litigation in
which the judgment of defectiveness is a very close call. If the design
decision was made in a careful and intelligent manner, the manufac-
turer should be entitled to defend its product without jeopardy that
the close-call case will inevitably find its way to a jury. We believe
that a legal system that rewards intelligent, open, and comprehensive
design safety decisions ultimately will promote greater safety in the
marketplace. We will be setting clearly delineated and attainable
goals for manufacturers rather than second-guessing design decisions
in close-call cases.
The potential for abuse of the process defense is substantial.
There is a threat that manufacturers could create paper records solely
for litigation. However, it is hard to conceive of an idea that cannot
be abused by the unscrupulous. For the fair, conscientious manufac-
turer, our proposal offers the assurance that the courts will judge the
entire design safety review process, rather than a single design deci-
sion removed from the context in which it was made. To the extent
that the process is held up to scrutiny, the beneficiaries will be the
consumers.
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